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Five Years in the Rise 
of the Modern Cruise Industry 
by 
Laurence Miller 
The years from 1969-74 were critical in the evolution of the passenger shipping 
industly from crossing to cruising. Faced with a decline in demand for point-to-point 
passenger transportation and an increase in the demand for cruises, steamship 
lines were also faced with a number of internal and external challenges. The writer 
discusses some companies that met these challenges, some that did not, and 
some new, cruise-oriented companies now leading the industry today. 
If any half decade can be said to have been critical in the develop 
ment of the present-day cruise industry, witnessing the transforma- 
tion from passenger ships as transportation to these same ships as 
destinations, it was the five years between and including 1969 and 
1974. During this brief time, major events shaped the industry as a 
whole and some major players in particular. 
Actions and reactions to these events as well as the trading envi- 
ronment arguably determined which lines would be major players in 
the '90s and which were not destined to stand the severe tests of time 
and changing conditions. 
At the start of this period, the ranks of passenger ships and com- 
panies in regular transatlantic service were thinned but still fonnida- 
ble. There was still regular Atlantic service with a choice of ships, 
lines, and destinations most seasons of the year. One could travel on 
the liners of such companies as Holland America, the French Line, 
and the Italian Line, in addition to the ultimate survivor - Cunard. 
The Swedish American, North German Lloyd, and Norwegian 
America Lines still had transatlantic schedules. 
But the writing was on the wall. A million passengers had crossed 
the Atlantic by sea in 1957. By 1965, this number had plummeted to 
650,000 and in 1968, the year immediately prior to the period under 
review, the numbers stood at 306,000.' 
Many Companies Had Financial Problems 
Many established companies were on the ropes. Their status was 
about to be made even more precarious by the Arab Oil Embargo and 
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the accompanying worldwide fuel shortage, which brought about can- 
celed voyages, a few uncompleted sailings, and fuel surcharges. 
The plight of most companies was made more difficult by a num- 
ber of factors which have since been outgrown or overcome. The fleets 
of most companies consisted of ships that were not economic, whether 
crossing or cruising. Any profits were seriously eroded by inflated 
labor costs thanks to single-nationality crews retained either out of 
sentiment or flag requirement. 
The corporate mental adjustment from cruising as a means of 
reducing off-season losses to cruising as a highly lucrative trade was 
just beginning. The mutually profitable marriage between air and 
cruise lines had in some instances been consummated, but for many 
firms was still in the early courtship stages. 
In 1971, the almost-new, 45,600-ton Michelangelo and Raffmllo of 
the Italian Line, the last Atlantic express liners ever built, carried 
between them 35,425 passengers on 42 crossings of the Atlanti~.~ This 
yielded a load factor of just 50 percent which, even in summer, aver- 
aged no better than 56 percent. By comparison, France averaged 74 
percent on the North Atlantic that year, and the QE2 69 per~ent .~  The 
experience of the leading four ships still in Atlantic service is repre- 
sentative of what was happening on the North Atlantic at that time: 
moderate availability of sailings, marginal load factors, and, with the 
possible exception of QE2, an otherwise very efficient ship, labor costs 
that absolutely precluded a profit. 
In the case of Italian Line, losses were assumed by the Italian tax- 
payer, thanks to the strong support of organized labor. But by this 
time, losses were so great that they were increasingly difficult to 
ignore even with the strength of the maritime unions. In 1974, losses 
incurred by the long-distance passenger services of the Finmare 
Group, which included the Italian Line, amounted to $60 mil l i~n.~ 
Holland America Line, more a creature of private enterprise, 
nearly went under through a combination of high labor costs and 
management blunders. Dutch labor unions, instead of compromising 
in the early '70s, increased their wage demands. Holland America 
responded by making the decision in September 1971 to transfer reg- 
istry of its ships to the Netherlands Antilles and discharging the 
Dutch service and deck crews that had been the hallmark of the line.5 
However, there had been inadequate training of the Indonesian 
replacements, something that undermined the sophistication of ser- 
vice levels available aboard the ships for several years. 
The French Line's France, fundamentally an Atlantic rather than 
a cruise liner, was withdrawn from service in September 1974. On her 
last voyage, the 1,100 crew members took over the ship, and held it in 
the English Channel while demanding a 35 percent wage in~rease.~ 
Swedish American Line, with a fleet of dual-purpose ships 
admirably designed more for cruising than for Atlantic service, and 
faced with the same set of tradeoffs as Holland America, elected to 
sell its two modern ships in 1975 and leave the passenger bu~iness.~ 
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As is ofien the case when businesses are in transition, the incen- 
tives not to continue in the passenger business seemed to loom much 
larger for some lines than the incentives to convert to cruising. In the 
case of Swedish American, the line faced a long period of labor diffi- 
culties which it was unwilling to face. In addition to spiraling fuel 
costs, their lovely and spacious ships, the Gripsholm and Kungsholm, 
also had some of the lowest passenger densities then in existence - 
another revenue-negative factor. 
Many Lines Barely Survive 
Norwegian America Line, offering ships that in category were 
quite similar to those of SAL, managed barely to hang on through this 
period. Density of its ships was quite similar to those of Swedish 
American. The 24,000-ton Sagafjord, built in 1965, carried just 425 
on luxury cruises but required a crew of 300. It is said that she lost 
money even when Ml, and has survived to the present day by having 
her accommodation increased to 660 through addition of inside cabins 
and singles converted to doubles? Norwegian America Line became 
Norwegian American Cruises in 1980 and was subsequently pur- 
chased by Cunard. 
Marine architects had yet to produce the super-profitable cruise 
ships of today made possible by modern propulsion, light-weight 
metals and prefabricated construction. In order to provide luxury 
standards for cruises with the five-star-plus ships of today, cruise 
vessels built prior to the '80s had to be large and of extremely low 
density. Examples included not only the Norwegian America and 
Swedish American vessels, but perhaps the best-known, Cunard's 
Caronia. Designed in an era when operating costs were much lower, 
owners of these ships found the market would not support fares that 
provided a good return on the investment, or even sufficient fares to 
break even. 
Thus some of the finest cruise ships ever built were not really 
viable just as cruising was coming into its own. In the future, ship- 
building technology would make it possible to provide the same or 
superior standards of accommodation in a much more economical 
physical plant. 
Arab Oil Embargo Has Impact 
Just as economies were stagnating in Europe and North America, 
the Arab Oil Embargo forced the price of heavy bunker fuel from 
about $35 per ton to $95 and higher. This had little impact on motor- 
ships, which used much less fuel, but most passenger vessels were 
still powered by steam turbines that typically consumed from 200 to 
400 tons of fuel per day at cruise-service speed. 
While many of the ships in existing fleets were lovely to behold, 
they were, in general, unsuited to making money in full-time cruising. 
Reasons included the following: 
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Many had been built to accommodate two or three classes of 
passengers. This meant duplicated facilities and, therefore, wasted 
space that could have been used for additional cabins, uneven stan- 
dards of accommodation, and inconvenient layouts when cruising as 
one-class ships. 
Draft often exceeded the 28.5-foot level accommodated in many 
cruise ports, and such features as bow thrusters to aid maneuvering 
in the absence of tugs were rare. Today's cruise ships typically draw 
25 feet of water or less. 
While discounting of passenger fares was comparatively rare, 
overall average standards aboard many ships precluded pricing at  
profitable levels. A large percentage of berths were intended to meet 
cabin- and tourist-class amenity levels. 
There was often a 'You come to us" marketing approach pro- 
moting the cruise product, a hangover from line-service days. 
A number of illustrations will add color to these generalizations. 
Many Lines Fail to Regain Profit 
Cunard, which was eventually to survive this era, had placed 
itself in jeopardy by commissioning in 1954-57 a quartet of 22,000- 
ton ships that  were not air-conditioned, in which most cabins 
lacked private facilities, and which carried 10,000 tons of cargo 
worked through seven h a t c h e ~ . ~  In 1962-63, the line converted the 
first two, which had also been badly decorated, into cruise ships 
and renamed them Franconia and Carmania, formerly the Saxonia 
and Ivernia. While cruising had shaped the refit, they emerged 
from the shipyard as dual-purpose Atlantidcruise liners, but with 
such non-amenities as exposed wiring, some cabins without private 
facilities, contemporary but rather gloomy interiors, and - in the 
case of the Franconia - an instrumental group that soon earned 
the nickname, "The  mortician^."'^ Except for the just-completed 
QE2, as the only ships left in the Cunard fleet, they were described 
as "marginally profitable" in 1971 by Cunard Chairman Sir Basil 
Smallpeice." 
Italian Line's lovely new 45,911-ton Michaelangelo and Raffaello, 
designed to maintain an Atlantic service to the Mediterranean start- 
ing in 1965, had a service speed of 26.5 knots and carried 1,775 pas- 
sengers in three classes. However, of five decks sited within their 
hulls, the lowest three had no portholes in what may have been a mis- 
guided safety move after open portholes were said to have hastened 
the sinking of the Andrea Doria.12 Portholes are easy to cut and this 
could have been corrected in their later careers. 
They might still be in service as this is written, enjoying the 
same panache as NCL7s Norway, were it not for the enginelboiler 
design. Each set of engine rooms and boilers drove just one propeller. 
This meant that both had to be staffed and operated regardless of 
service speed. When in 1975 the "Renaissance Liners" were taken 
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out of service and placed on the market, they were inspected by 
Carnival, Chandris, and every other line in an expansion mode, but 
rejected as incapable of making cruising profits; this in spite of spec- 
tacularly fine sun areas and public rooms. 
It should also be mentioned that all'state-owned Italian passen- 
ger companies were saddled by a particularly inefficient and, a t  
times, incompetent parent organization that had been capable of pro- 
ducing ships of this design in the first place. Later an attempt was 
made to run the most cruising-suitable ships under the aegis of a 
new company, Italian Cruises International. However, with the same 
management and labor problems, plus poorly-refitted ships, the 
effort was doomed to failure. 
New Entrepreneurs Enter the Scene 
Just as several traditional lines were in their death throes, new 
entrepreneurs came to the fore on the South Florida cruise scene. One 
has to go to the mid-'60s to trace the prehistory of what was to h a p  
pen in the 1969-74 period. 
Until then, quality cruises from the area were mainly available 
through seasonal deployments by such lines as Italian Line, Home 
Lines, and Costa. Cruise ships oRen called there to pick up or disem- 
bark passengers on cruises that originated in New York. 
New York was still the cruise capital of the world. Companies 
with year-round programs included Chandris, Cunard, Greek Line, 
Incres, Holland America, especially toward the end of this period, and 
Home Lines. Of these, only Chandris and Home Lines were really 
successful. They survived the early '70s and the oil embargo, along 
with Cunard and Holland America. Greek Line and Incres, which 
offered highly successful cruise programs in the '50s and '60s were 
forced under by the fuel crisis and the interest of their owners in pur- 
suing other investments, notably tankers, financially lethal for some 
firms with the onset of the embargo. 
Year-round cruise programs from Florida were available primarily 
aboard former American coastwise steamers such as  Eastern 
Shipping's Evangeline, Yarmouth, and Bahama Star, the Florida of 
Peninsular and Occidental, and offerings by marginal operators. 
Proximity to warm-water cruising was, to some extent, offset by dis- 
tance from major population centers. This factor was soon to be over- 
come through the magic of the airlsea program. 
Ted Arison Has Influence 
Ted Arison, who was later to found Carnival Cruise Lines, had a 
hand in changing this through his role as general sales agent for, 
among other vessels from time to time, the modern car fenylcruise 
ship Nili, owned by the private Israeli firm Somerfin. The ship began 
to offer three- and four-day cruises from Miami to Nassau. This ser- 
vice came to an end when, thanks to the line's cargo operations, 
Somerfin collapsed financially.13 
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Simultaneously, the Norwegian shipowner Knut Kloster had a mod- 
ern vessel but no trade for her. He had completed the original Sunward 
in 1966 for the U.K.-Gibraltar trade which ended when the Spanish 
closed the border with the British colony Reading of Kloster's plight in 
navel Weekly, Arison met with him and, in return for guaranteeing him 
an income of a half million dollars the first year of operation, obtained 
the agency for the ship. Arison did not have the money, but made the 
guarantee anyway, and was lucky when the service prospered. 
The agreement between Arison and Kloster called for the former 
to receive a commission of 22 percent. In return, Arison served not 
only as sales agent, but also performed certain shoreside services. 
In 1972, there was a disagreement between Arison and Kloster 
over how much money was owed the latter. The agency agreement 
dissolved, and Kloster hired away most of Arison's staff. Arison decid- 
ed to let the courts determine the fate of the money in contention, but 
meanwhile used these funds to found his own company, Carnival 
Cruise Line, in Association with AITS (American International ?'ravel 
Service) which provided $6.5 million in initial financing. This incident 
was to color the relationship between two of the key players in the 
American cruise industry for years to come. 
Arison went to England with the object of purchasing the 
Cunarders Franconia and Carmania, then laid up in the River Fal. 
He had even decided that the ships of his new cruise line would com- 
prise the "Golden Fleet," since there were originally to have been two 
ships. On inspecting the Cunarders, he was less than delighted with 
their condition and general suitability, It came to his attention that 
Canadian Pacific's Empress of Canada, a greatly superior ship, was 
for sale. Arison inspected her, liked her, and, as the saying goes, the 
rest is history. She became Mardi Gras, Carnival's first ship, entering 
service in 1972. 
Modern Cruise Industry Begins 
In the first three years of the decade, as the old era of point-to- 
point transportation was dying, some important components of the 
modern cruise industry were in place. 
In 1971, Kloster completed a rapidly-developed fleet of four mod- 
ern 'White Ships," marketed extensively on an airlsea basis. Largely 
car ferries in basic design mode, their accommodations, public areas, 
and deck space were high density but, nevertheless, very competitive 
as cruise ships by contemporary standards. 
Carnival had made a modest beginning, and was struggling, but 
destined to make it. The firm had not yet acquired its second ship, 
which was essential to survival. This was to come in 1975-76 when 
Carnival purchased Queen Anna Maria, later Carniuale, from the 
bankrupt Greek Line. 
Another small operator, Commodore Cruise Lines, had been oper- 
ating two car ferrylcruise ships so typical of early new buildings. 
These were Boheme, completed as a new ship in 1968 and placed in 
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service, assisted on a seasonal basis from 1969 by Bolero. Commodore 
was destined never to achieve breakthrough status, though it sur- 
vives to the present day operating two older cruise ships. 
Costa was heavily involved in cruising from South Florida 
throughout this period and employed mainly rebuilt or upgraded sec- 
ond-hand tonnage, seemingly on an "as available" basis. 
I t  was left to the Norwegians to usher in cruising's new era. 
Nothing illustrates better the evolution experienced during this five- 
year period, during which the France and major Italian liners still 
sailed the Atlantic in regular service, than the birth of Royal 
Caribbean Cruise Lines and Royal Viking Line. 
The former was the project of two Norwegian freight companies, 
Skaugen and Wilhelmsen. They commissioned in rapid succession the 
Song ofNorway (19701, Nordic Prince (19711, and Sun Viking (1972). 
Two other Norwegian companies, Det Bergenske and A.F. 
Klaveness, placed in service during 1972 and 1973 the three original 
ships of Royal Viking Line, Royal Viking Star (1972), Royal Viking 
Sky (1973), and Royal Viking Sea (late 1973). These were designed to 
duplicate the luxury cruise standards of such earlier traditional ships 
as Cunard's Caronia in a modern hull. 
These cruise ships represented something completely different 
from anything that had entered service previously. They were intend- 
ed never to sail in line service. They were also designed, from the keel 
up, to be cruise ships. In this, they transcended and outclassed the 
transitional modern vessels that either had been built as high-class 
car ferries, such as Kloster's original Sunward, or those where the 
design had much in common with that of a car ferry, in some cases 
with garage accommodation, such as NCL's "White Ships" and La 
Boheme, quintessential examples of transitional designs. 
The contrasts evident during this period can be realized when one 
considers t h a t  the  construction of Cunard's QE2 and Royal 
Caribbean's Song of Norway were but one year apart, commissioned 
in 1969 and 1970, respectively. The Cunard ship, while intended as 
dual-purpose, is more Atlantic than cruise ship in its design. Song of 
Norway, which reaches the age of 25 this year, was in every way the 
modern single-purpose cruise ship. 
The five-year period that is the focus of this article represented, in 
many respects, a process of natural selection for the industry. The 
companies that could adapt sufficiently to deliver a cruise product in 
exchange for which passengers were willing to contribute the full, 
unsubsidized cost survived. The new companies formed during this 
period constitute the basis of the modern cruise industry. For many 
reasons - lack of entrepreneurial interest andlor skills, failure to 
reach accommodation with unions, insufficient flexibility and adapt- 
ability, or simply overwhelming difficulties - some of the best-known 
lines failed to make it. It is interesting to observe the factors that 
advanced and hindered companies on the path to demise or survival 
as part of the present-day cruise industry. 
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